MARS voting: Difference between revisions
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==Properties== |
==Properties== |
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MARS voting reduces the incentive for strategic voting in the form of burying, min-max or bullet voting. Voter can make use of the full range of scores with only a small probability of having a less preferred candidate beat their favorite because of the vote. |
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It satisfies the following criteria: equal vote criterion ("Frohnmayer balance"), [[monotonicity]], participation, clones, [[favorite betrayal]], [[precinct summability]], [[reversal symmetry]]. |
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MARS voting intentionally fails the Condorcet winner criterion in cases where the score winner outweighs the Condorcet winner. For the same reason it also fails the Condorcet looser criterion and majority winner, but less so then pure score (consider 51 voters: A0 B1, 49 voters: A5, B0, A wins). Further failed criteria are: Later-no-harm, IIA. |
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By using two types of information MARS voting can resolve top ties in most cases. The amount of true ties that can not be resolved is reduced to a small fraction. |
By using two types of information MARS voting can resolve top ties in most cases. The amount of true ties that can not be resolved is reduced to a small fraction. |
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