Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval: Difference between revisions
imported>KVenzke No edit summary |
imported>KVenzke |
||
| Line 6: | Line 6: | ||
A candidate is ''dominated'' if more than half of the voters rank some other candidate strictly above him. |
A candidate is ''dominated'' if more than half of the voters rank some other candidate strictly above him. |
||
All dominated candidates are eliminated, unless this would eliminate all the candidates. |
|||
Of remaining candidates, the one approved by the most voters is elected. |
|||
Elect the first candidate in the resulting ranking. |
|||
==Criteria== |
==Criteria== |
||
Revision as of 02:21, 29 July 2005
Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval or MDDA is a method devised by Kevin Venzke for the purpose of showing that the Favorite Betrayal criterion, Strategy-Free criterion, and Strong Defensive Strategy criterion are mutually compatible. The name was given by Mike Ossipoff.
Procedure
The voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The candidates explicitly ranked are considered approved by that voter.
A candidate is dominated if more than half of the voters rank some other candidate strictly above him.
All dominated candidates are eliminated, unless this would eliminate all the candidates.
Of remaining candidates, the one approved by the most voters is elected.
Criteria
MDDA satisfies the Favorite Betrayal criterion, Strategy-Free criterion, the Strong Defensive Strategy criterion (and Minimal Defense criterion), monotonicity, and (check this) the Plurality criterion.
It fails Clone-Winner, the Generalized Strategy-Free criterion, the Condorcet criterion, the Smith criterion, Participation, the Majority criterion for solid coalitions, and Later-no-harm.
Work in progress.