Participation criterion: Difference between revisions
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the winner from X to Y.
''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org''
== See
*[[Voting system]]
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*[[Summability criterion]]
== External
* [http://electionmethods.org/ Election Methods Education and Research Group]
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Revision as of 02:41, 22 October 2019
Statement of Criterion
Adding one or more ballots that vote X over Y should never change the winner from X to Y.
Complying Methods
Plurality voting, Approval voting, Cardinal Ratings, Borda count, and Woodall's DAC and DSC methods all pass the Participation Criterion. Condorcet methods, Majority Choice Approval, and IRV fail.
Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org
See also
- Voting system
- Monotonicity criterion
- Condorcet Criterion
- Generalized Condorcet criterion
- Strategy-Free criterion
- Generalized Strategy-Free criterion
- Strong Defensive Strategy criterion
- Weak Defensive Strategy criterion
- Favorite Betrayal criterion
- Summability criterion