Weak Defensive Strategy criterion
The weak defensive strategy criterion is .... [Please help complete this article.]
Statement of criterion[edit | edit source]
If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one candidate over another.
Complying methods[edit | edit source]
Majority-choice approval, Schulze, and approval methods comply with the weak defensive strategy criterion, while Range voting, Borda count, plurality voting, and instant-runoff voting do not comply.
Commentary[edit | edit source]
WDSC is identical to the Strong Defensive Strategy criterion (SDSC), except that the phrase "or falsely voting two candidates equal" is removed from the end. That difference allows the approval method to comply.
Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org
External links[edit | edit source]
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