Plurality criterion: Difference between revisions
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<p><em>If the number of ballots ranking ''A'' as the first preference is greater than the number of ballots on which another candidate ''B'' is given any preference, then ''A''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s probability of election must be greater than ''B''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s.</em></p> |
<p><em>If the number of ballots ranking ''A'' as the first preference is greater than the number of ballots on which another candidate ''B'' is given any preference, then ''A''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s probability of election must be greater than ''B''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s.</em></p> |
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The reasoning behind this criterion is that, if A has more first preferences than B has any kind of preferences, it's intuitively implausible that there could be a good reason to elect B instead of A. |
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<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4> |
<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4> |
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Revision as of 05:14, 23 March 2005
Statement of Criterion
If the number of ballots ranking A as the first preference is greater than the number of ballots on which another candidate B is given any preference, then A's probability of election must be greater than B's.
The reasoning behind this criterion is that, if A has more first preferences than B has any kind of preferences, it's intuitively implausible that there could be a good reason to elect B instead of A.
Complying Methods
First-Preference Plurality, Approval voting, IRV, and many Condorcet methods (using winning votes as defeat strength) satisfy the Plurality criterion. Condorcet methods using margins as the measure of defeat strength fail it, as do Raynaud regardless of the measure of defeat strength, and also Minmax(pairwise opposition).