Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions
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imported>Homunq No edit summary |
imported>Homunq |
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* 40: C>B |
* 40: C>B |
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None are majority-rejected, and C is the frontrunner. Points are: A, 60; B, 55; C, 55; X, 35. A wins. However, if |
None are majority-rejected, and C is the frontrunner. Points are: A, 60; B, 55; C, 55; X, 35. A wins. However, if 11 of the last group of voters strategically betrayed their true favorite C, the situation would be as follows: |
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* 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected) |
* 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected) |
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* 15: B>A |
* 15: B>A |
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* 10: B>AC |
* 10: B>AC |
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* 29: C>B |
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* 11: B |
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Now, C is not viable with 51% rejection; so B is the leader. Since C is no longer the leader, B gets the 34 points from C voters, and wins. The strategy succeeded; the strategic voters are better off. |
Now, C is not viable with 51% rejection; so B is the leader. Since C is no longer the leader, B gets the 34 points from C voters, and wins. The strategy succeeded; the strategic voters are better off. |