Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions

Line 53:

However, there are several ways to "rescue" FBC-like behavior for this system.

~~First~~, add a "compromise" option to the ballot, as described in [[FBPPAR]].

For one, we could add a "compromise" option to the ballot, as described in [[FBPPAR]].

~~Second~~, restrict the domain to voting scenarios which meet the following restrictions:

For another, we could restrict the domain to voting scenarios which meet the following restrictions:

# Each candidate either comes from one of no more than 3 "ideological categories", or is "nonviable".

Line 64:

If the above restrictions hold, then PAR voting would meet FBC. It is arguably likely that real-world voting scenarios will meet the above restrictions, except for a negligible fraction of "ideologically atypical" voters. For instance, in the first scenario above, the categories appear to be {XA}, {B}, and {C}, so the B>AC voters would probably actually vote either B>A or B>C.

~~Third~~, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if 11 of the AX>B voters switch to >AXB, then A is eliminated without any betrayal.

And finally, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if 11 of the AX>B voters switch to >AXB, then A is eliminated without any betrayal.

== An example ==