Proportional representation: Difference between revisions

In effect, the method produces groups of voters of equal size that reflect the diversity of the electorate, each group having a representative the group voted for. Some 90% of voters have a representative to whom they gave their first preference. Voters can choose candidates using any criteria they wish, the proportionality is implicit.<ref name=DMstvPdf/> Political parties are not necessary; all other prominent PR electoral systems presume that parties reflect voters wishes, which many believe gives power to parties.<ref name=tidemanSTV/> STV satisfies the [[Comparison of electoral systems|electoral system criterion]] ''[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions|proportionality for solid coalitions]]''{{snd}} – a solid coalition for a set of candidates is the group of voters that rank all those candidates above all others{{snd}} – and is therefore considered a system of proportional representation.<ref name=tidemanSTV/> However, the small district magnitude used in STV elections has been criticized as impairing proportionality, especially when more parties compete than there are seats available,<ref name=forder/>{{rp|50}} and STV has, for this reason, sometimes been labelled "quasi proportional".<ref name=AusOVC/>{{rp|83}} While this may be true when considering districts in isolation, results {{em|overall}} are proportional. In Ireland, with particularly small magnitudes, results are "highly proportional".<ref name=ideaEsd/>{{rp|73}}<ref name=ideaGallagher/> In [[1997 Irish general election|1997]], the average magnitude was 4.0 but eight parties gained representation, four of them with less than 3% of first preference votes nationally. Six independent candidates also won election.<ref name=laver/> STV has also been described as the {{em|most}} proportional system.<ref name=AusOVC/>{{rp|83}} The system tends to handicap extreme candidates because, to gain preferences and so improve their chance of election, candidates need to canvass voters beyond their own circle of supporters, and so need to moderate their views.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Referendum 2011: A look at the STV system |url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10762976 |publisher=The New Zealand Herald |date=1 Nov 2011 |access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Auckland|work=[[The New Zealand Herald]] }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |title=Change the Way We Elect? Round Two of the Debate |url=https://thetyee.ca/Views/2009/04/30/STV2/ |magazine=The Tyee |date=30 Apr 2009 |access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Vancouver}}</ref> Conversely, widely respected candidates can win election with relatively few first preferences by benefitting from strong subordinate preference support.<ref name=DMstvPdf/>

The term ''STV'' in Australia refers to the Senate electoral system, a variant of ''Hare-Clark'' characterized by the "above the line" [[group voting ticket]], a party list option. It is used in the Australian upper house, the [[Australian Senate|Senate]], most state upper houses, the [[Tasmania|Tasmanian]] lower house and the Capital Territory assembly. Due to the number of preferences that are compulsory if a vote for candidates (below-the-line) is to be valid{{snd}} – for the Senate a minimum of 90% of candidates must be scored, in 2013 in [[New South Wales]] that meant writing 99 preferences on the ballot<ref name=prsaHC/>{{snd}} – 95% and more of voters use the above-the-line option, making the system, in all but name, a party list system.<ref name=uwaAbove>{{cite web|title=Above the line voting |url=http://elections.uwa.edu.au/glossaryc.lasso?CondensedGlossary=abovethelinevoting |publisher=University of Western Australia |access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=Perth}}</ref><ref name=abcGlossaryGVT>{{cite web |title=Glossary of Election Terms |url=http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2010/guide/glossary.htm#group_voting_ticket |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation|access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=Sydney}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hill|first1=I.D.|date=November 2000 |title=How to ruin STV |journal=Voting Matters |issue=12 |url = http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE12/P7.htm |access-date=10 August 2013}}</ref> Parties determine the order in which candidates are elected and also control transfers to other lists and this has led to anomalies: preference deals between parties, and "micro parties" which rely entirely on these deals. Additionally, independent candidates are unelectable unless they form, or join, a group above-the-line.<ref name=anthonyGreen04>{{cite web|last=Green|first=Anthony|title=Above or below the line? Managing preference votes|url=http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3359&page=0 |publisher=On Line Opinion|date=20 April 2005|access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Australia}}</ref><ref name=ersDog>{{cite web|last=Terry|first=Chris|title=Serving up a dog's breakfast|url=http://devers2.speedster-it.com/blog/serving-up-a-dogs-breakfast|publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]]|date=5 April 2012|access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007220903/http://devers2.speedster-it.com/blog/serving-up-a-dogs-breakfast|archive-date=7 October 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> Concerning the development of STV in Australia researchers have observed: "... we see real evidence of the extent to which Australian politicians, particularly at national levels, are prone to fiddle with the electoral system".<ref name=AusOVC>{{cite book|title=The Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations, and Consequences |date=2006|publisher=[[UNSW Press]] |location=Sydney |isbn=978-0868408583 |author=David M. Farrell |author2=Ian McAllister}}</ref>{{rp|86}}

The system has the potential to produce proportional results, but proportionality can be compromised if the ratio of list to district seats is too low, it may then not be possible to completely compensate district seat disproportionality. Another factor can be how [[overhang seat]]s are handled, district seats that a party wins in excess of the number due to it under the list vote. To achieve proportionality, other parties require "balance seats", increasing the size of parliament by twice the number of overhang seats, but this is not always done. Until recently, Germany increased the size of parliament by the number of overhang seats but did not use the increased size for apportioning list seats. This was changed for the 2013 national election after the constitutional court rejected the previous law, not compensating for overhang seats had resulted in a [[negative vote weight]] effect.<ref>{{cite news|title=Deutschland hat ein neues Wahlrecht |url=http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-02/bundestag-wahlrecht-beschluss |publisher=[[Zeit Online]]|language=de|date=22 February 2013}}</ref> Lesotho, Scotland and Wales do not increase the size of parliament at all, and, in 2012, a New Zealand parliamentary commission also proposed abandoning compensation for overhang seats, and so fixing the size of parliament. At the same time, it would abolish the single-seat threshold{{snd}} – any such seats would then be overhang seats and would otherwise have increased the size of parliament further{{snd}} – and reduce the electoral threshold from 5% to 4%. Proportionality would not suffer.<ref name=ideaEsd/><ref name=NZ2012EC>{{cite web|title=Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System|url=http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|publisher=[[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission New Zealand]]|location=Wellington|access-date=10 Aug 2014|date=2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140707151142/http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|archive-date=7 July 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Balinski has proposed another variant called [[fair majority voting]] (FMV) to replace single-winner plurality/majoritarian electoral systems, in particular the system used for the [[US House of Representatives]]. FMV introduces proportionality without changing the method of voting, the number of seats, or the{{snd}}possibly –possibly gerrymandered{{snd}}district –district boundaries. Seats would be apportioned to parties in a proportional manner at the [[U.S. state|state]] level.<ref name=balinskiFMV/> In a related proposal for the [[UK parliament]], whose elections are contested by many more parties, the authors note that parameters can be tuned to adopt any degree of proportionality deemed acceptable to the electorate. In order to elect smaller parties, a number of constituencies would be awarded to candidates placed fourth or even fifth in the constituency{{snd}} – unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate, the authors concede{{snd}} – but this effect could be substantially reduced by incorporating a third, regional, apportionment tier, or by specifying minimum thresholds.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Akartunali|first1=Kerem|last2=Knight|first2=Philip A.|date=January 2014|title=Network Models and Biproportional Apportionment for Fair Seat Allocations in the UK Elections| url=http://personal.strath.ac.uk/kerem.akartunali/research/Voting_preprint.pdf |publisher=[[University of Strathclyde]]|access-date=10 August 2014}}</ref>