Proportionality for Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions
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Arguably there is some kind of coalition of 45 voters backing candidates A through J here, and since the largest opposing coalition is 8 voters, D'Hondt would say that the 45-voter coalition ought to win all 5 seats. At that point, one could eliminate all candidates outside the 45-voter coalition (K and L) at which point A through E all are a Hare quota's 1st choice and must all win. This sort of thinking is generally what Condorcet PR methods such as Schulze STV do. |
Arguably there is some kind of coalition of 45 voters backing candidates A through J here, and since the largest opposing coalition is 8 voters, D'Hondt would say that the 45-voter coalition ought to win all 5 seats. At that point, one could eliminate all candidates outside the 45-voter coalition (K and L) at which point A through E all are a Hare quota's 1st choice and must all win. This sort of thinking is generally what Condorcet PR methods such as Schulze STV do. |
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Properties analagous to PSC can be considered for multi-winner voting methods that aren't proportional. For example, [[Bloc voting|Bloc Score voting]] guarantees that a majority solid coalition can elect all of its preferred candidates if they set their [[approval threshold]] between their preferred candidates and all other candidates. |
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== See Also == |
== See Also == |