Ranked voting: Difference between revisions
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Recently, an increasing number of authors, including [[David Farrell (political scientist)|David Farrell]], [[Ian McAllister (political scientist)|Ian McAllister]] and [[Jurij Toplak]], see preferentiality as one of the characteristics by which electoral systems can be evaluated.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Toplak|first=Jurij|date=2017|title=Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification|journal=Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government|volume=15|issue=4|pages=737–761|doi=10.4335/15.4.737-761(2017)}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Farrell|first1=David M.|first2=Ian|last2=McAllister|date=2004-02-20|title=Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference|url=http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04|language=en}}</ref> According to this view, all electoral methods are preferential, but to different degrees and may even be classified according to their preferentiality.<ref name=":02" /> By this logic, [[cardinal voting]] methods such as [[Score voting]] or [[STAR voting]] are also "preferential".
== Notes ==
One criticism that can be made of ranked voting is that it creates a logical contradiction: if a voter ranks X>Y>Z, then the strength of their preference for X>Z must be stronger than their preference for X>Y or Y>Z, yet all 3 preferences are generally treated as equally strong in most ranked methods. [[Approval voting]] (and [[Rated method|rated methods]] in general) can be thought of as a ranked method with constraints placed that fully resolve this contradiction: if an Approval ballot is thought of as a voter ranking one set of candidates equally 1st and above all others, then when a voter ranks an approved candidate above a disapproved candidate, they can't further indicate a preference between the disapproved candidates, thus ensuring that the strength of preference in each matchup is consistent with the strength in other matchups i.e. if they approve only X, then the strength of X>Y will be the same as X>Z, since the full preference is treated as X>Y=Z. [[Score voting]] takes this a step further by allowing voters to vary their degree of approval; in some sense, this can be seen in the ranked context by first using the [[KP transform]] and then converting the resulting Approval ballots into ranked ballots as mentioned above. This allows voters to essentially "vote against themselves" in certain matchups or otherwise split their ballot up in such a way that only a fraction of it shows a preference between certain candidates, while the rest of the ballot is treated as indifferent between those candidates i.e. a voter giving 100% support to A, 70% to B, and 10% for C is treated as 10% of an A=B=C voter, 60% of an A=B voter, and 30% of an A voter, thus allowing them to have, for example, only 60% of their ballot showing preference for B>C, rather than 100%.
== References ==
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