Ranked voting: Difference between revisions

Recently, an increasing number of authors, including [[David Farrell (political scientist)|David Farrell]], [[Ian McAllister (political scientist)|Ian McAllister]] and [[Jurij Toplak]], see preferentiality as one of the characteristics by which electoral systems can be evaluated.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Toplak|first=Jurij|date=2017|title=Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification|journal=Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government|volume=15|issue=4|pages=737–761|doi=10.4335/15.4.737-761(2017)}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Farrell|first1=David M.|first2=Ian|last2=McAllister|date=2004-02-20|title=Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference|url=http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04|language=en}}</ref> According to this view, all electoral methods are preferential, but to different degrees and may even be classified according to their preferentiality.<ref name=":02" /> By this logic, [[cardinal voting]] methods such as [[Score voting]] or [[STAR voting]] are also "preferential".

 

One criticism that can be made of ranked voting is that it creates a logical contradiction: if a voter ranks X>Y>Z, then the strength of their preference for X>Z must be stronger than their preference for X>Y or Y>Z, yet all 3 preferences are generally treated as equally strong in most ranked methods. This can most clearly be seen in many [[Condorcet methods]]: in the [[Head-to-head matchup|head-to-head matchups]], the voter is considered to give 1 vote in all 3 matchups, rather than giving less of a vote in the X>Y and Y>Z matchups and more of a vote in the X>Z matchup.