STAR voting: Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (add some links) |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 73: | Line 73: | ||
In summary, STAR voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[resolvability criterion]], the [[majority criterion]], and [[reversal symmetry]]. It does not satisfy either the [[Condorcet criterion]] (i.e., is not a [[Condorcet method]]) or the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], although with all-strategic voters and perfect information the Condorcet winner is a [[Nash equilibrium]].<ref>Laslier, J.-F. (2006) [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/12/17/51/PDF/stratapproval4.pdf "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate,"] ''IDEP Working Papers'' No. 405 (Marseille, France: Institut D'Economie Publique)</ref> It does not satisfy the [[later-no-harm criterion]], meaning that giving a positive rating to a less preferred candidate can cause a more preferred candidate to lose. |
In summary, STAR voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[resolvability criterion]], the [[majority criterion]], and [[reversal symmetry]]. It does not satisfy either the [[Condorcet criterion]] (i.e., is not a [[Condorcet method]]) or the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], although with all-strategic voters and perfect information the Condorcet winner is a [[Nash equilibrium]].<ref>Laslier, J.-F. (2006) [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/12/17/51/PDF/stratapproval4.pdf "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate,"] ''IDEP Working Papers'' No. 405 (Marseille, France: Institut D'Economie Publique)</ref> It does not satisfy the [[later-no-harm criterion]], meaning that giving a positive rating to a less preferred candidate can cause a more preferred candidate to lose. |
||
== Discussion == |
|||
A modification to STAR that takes degree of preference more into account would be to make each voter's vote in the runoff only as strong as the highest score they gave to any candidate. In other words, a voter who gave their favorite a 3/5 (3 out of 5) would have only 3/5ths of a vote in the runoff, rather than a full vote. This modification allows voters to express less-than-full support for any candidate in both the score round and the runoff. |
|||
==See also== |
==See also== |
||