STLR voting: Difference between revisions

Linking to 2019 discussion about STLR, and trying to fix up the #References section
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(Linking to 2019 discussion about STLR, and trying to fix up the #References section)
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== Invention and Motivation==
 
The concept was invented by [[Equal Vote Coalition]] Director [[Keith Edmonds]] and was first proposed publicly in July 2020<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://forum.electionscience.org/t/a-new-star-variant/708/28|title=CES Forum Post|last=|first=|date=Monday, August 3, 2020 at 7:40:16 PM Coordinated Universal Time|website=forum.electionscience.org|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://www.votingtheory.org/archive/posts?where=%7B%22topic_id%22%3A708%7D|archive-date=?|access-date=2022-08-14|publisher=VotingTheory.org}}</ref>.
 
The originally proposed runoff method was not levelling but the normalization from [[Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings]] (IRNR). Levelling chosen to be better shortly after. The version with IRNR normalization was previously and independently invented by user lucasvb on Reddit<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/bl6zrq/score_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff/|title=score_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff|last=|first=|date=May 6, 2019|website=|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2Fr%2FEndFPTP%2Fcomments%2Fbl6zrq%2Fscore_then_automatic_cumulative_runoff%2F|archive-date=2022-05-01|access-date=2022-08-14}}</ref>. The idea came from an attempt to solve the issue of arbitrary scale in [[Score voting]]. [[STAR voting]] solves this with the majoritarian runoff but as a result makes the system a majoritarian system.
 
=== Scale in Score Voting ===
 
When analyzing the ballots from the French studies<ref>“How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting” European Journal of Political Economy 55 (2018) 14–28, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006, Baujard, Gavrel, Igersheim, Laslier, and Lebon.</ref> <ref>Baujard, Antoinette & Igersheim, Herrade & Lebon, Isabelle & Gavrel, Frederic & Laslier, Jean-Francois. (2013). Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election. Electoral Studies. 34. 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003. </ref> and primary election for the Independent Party of Oregon <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Oregon-Independent-voters-favor-Biden-over-Trump-but-other-Republicans-over-Democrats-570644271.html|title=Oregon Independent voters favour Biden over Trump|last=|first=|date=|website=|url-status=livedead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200528205542/https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Oregon-Independent-voters-favor-Biden-over-Trump-but-other-Republicans-over-Democrats-570644271.html|archive-date=2020-05-28|access-date=2022-08-14}}</ref> a well known criticism of score voting arose. This is that some voters tend to be too honest and to not score any candidate at the <math>MAX</math> and <math>MIN</math> values. In a score election the amount of influence a voter has is the difference between the maximum and minimum score they give a candidate. The standard response is that voters are told how the system works and it is up to them to decide how to use the scores.
 
A related issue is that of deciding who gets a score of 0. Only the worst or just those unfavoured? What is typically advised is for voters to give their the maximum value to their favourite and zero to any candidate they do not support.