Score voting: Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
No edit summary |
|||
| Line 114: | Line 114: | ||
=== Connection to Condorcet methods === |
=== Connection to Condorcet methods === |
||
[[File:Condorcet utilitarianism compare and contrast example.png|thumb|2052x2052px]] |
[[File:Condorcet utilitarianism compare and contrast example.png|thumb|2052x2052px]] |
||
Usually, Score voting is computed by adding the scores on each voter's ballot to find the candidate with the most points, who wins. But one can also do it (in a theoretical, and more difficult manner) by, for each pair of candidates, subtracting the score of the lower-scored candidate from the higher-scored candidate, and putting this in a [[Pairwise counting|pairwise counting]] table. The candidate who gets more points in their matchups against all other candidates wins. Example: <blockquote>2: A:5 B:4 C:1 |
Usually, Score voting is computed by adding the scores on each voter's ballot to find the candidate with the most points, who wins. But one can also do it (in a theoretical, and more difficult manner) by, for each pair of candidates, subtracting the score of the lower-scored candidate from the higher-scored candidate, and putting this in a [[Pairwise counting|pairwise counting]] table. The candidate who gets more points in their matchups against all other candidates wins. Example: <blockquote>2: A:5 B:4 C:1 |
||
1: C:5 B:3 A:2 </blockquote>The scores are A 12 B 11 C 7. |
1: C:5 B:3 A:2 </blockquote>The scores are A 12 B 11 C 7. |
||
| Line 146: | Line 146: | ||
Score's satisfaction of the above-mentioned property (max of 1 vote of differentiation in a beatpath) is one of the reasons it nominally passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives where Condorcet methods don't, as the only time those methods fail it is when no [[Beats-all winner|beats-all winner]] exists, and forcing Condorcet methods to satisfy that property ensures a beats-or-ties-all winner will exist. |
Score's satisfaction of the above-mentioned property (max of 1 vote of differentiation in a beatpath) is one of the reasons it nominally passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives where Condorcet methods don't, as the only time those methods fail it is when no [[Beats-all winner|beats-all winner]] exists, and forcing Condorcet methods to satisfy that property ensures a beats-or-ties-all winner will exist. |
||
When the Score winner is the Condorcet winner, and all voters expressed all of their ranked preferences with the scores, then this means that each voter could exaggerate their preference in each head-to-head matchup from the weak pairwise preference they expressed in Score to a maximal pairwise preference. |
|||
== Notes == |
== Notes == |
||