Score voting: Difference between revisions
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about those candidates. |
about those candidates. |
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Range voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[participation criterion]], the [[Consistency Criterion]], the [[summability criterion]], the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]], [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], the [[Non-compulsory support criterion]], Mono-Add-Top, Pareto, Plurality Criterion, and [[Strategic nomination|independence of clones]]. |
Range voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[participation criterion]], the [[Consistency Criterion]], the [[summability criterion]], the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]], [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], the [[Non-compulsory support criterion]], Mono-Add-Top, [[Pareto criterion]], Plurality Criterion, and [[Strategic nomination|independence of clones]]. |
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Range voting does not comply with the [[Condorcet criterion]] because it allows for the difference between 'rankings' to matter. E.g. 51 people might rate A at 100, and B at 90, while 49 people rate A at 0, and B at 100. Condorcet would consider this 51 people voting A>B, and 49 voting B>A, and A would win. Range voting would see this as A having support of 5100/100 = 51%, and B support of (51*90+49*100)/100 = 94.9%. Score voting advocates say that in this case, the Condorcet winner is not the socially ideal winner. |
Range voting does not comply with the [[Condorcet criterion]] because it allows for the difference between 'rankings' to matter. E.g. 51 people might rate A at 100, and B at 90, while 49 people rate A at 0, and B at 100. Condorcet would consider this 51 people voting A>B, and 49 voting B>A, and A would win. Range voting would see this as A having support of 5100/100 = 51%, and B support of (51*90+49*100)/100 = 94.9%. Score voting advocates say that in this case, the Condorcet winner is not the socially ideal winner. |
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