Single Contest: Difference between revisions
Content deleted Content added
mistake |
imported>KVenzke more |
||
Line 5:
# If there is a strict majority favorite (not counting equal-top rankings to the majority) then this candidate wins.
# Otherwise, elect the winner of the pairwise contest between the pair of candidates who minimize the number of voters that approved neither one. For example, if no one approved A or B, there are no votes for the AB pair. If everyone voted for at least one of A and B, all votes are for the AB pair.
# If pairs are tied on this measure, break the tie for the pair whose winner has the most voters on his side in that contest (i.e. winning votes). Secondarily, break ties in favor of the pair whose winner has the most approval. (This order might get reversed in the future, since WV is based on rankings and the idea is to minimize the importance.)
==Comments==
Line 12:
There is potentially strategy with the majority favorite rule, as creating a majority favorite will end the method prematurely and possibly in a way that a voter prefers.
Manipulating which contest will be selected as the "single contest" is not straightforward. The only way to vote against a contest (because one foresees that it won't resolve favorably) is to approve neither candidate involved. Similarly, there is no way to prop up a contest (foreseeing that it will be easily won by one's preferred candidate) when one was already going to approve one of the candidates.
Single Contest satisfies Condorcet Loser, but not Condorcet:
|