Dominant mutual third set: Difference between revisions
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It can be proven that several other [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods|Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] pass dominant mutual third burial resistance. For example, with [[Benham's method]], since at least one member of the smallest DMT set is guaranteed to be one of the two final remaining candidates after eliminating the rest, there is no incentive for a voter who honestly prefers that DMT member over the other final remaining candidate to not vote that preference i.e. the same incentive for honest voting exists as if it was a [[runoff]]. This is one major reason cited by those who prefer Condorcet-IRV methods, as they claim that most elections feature a DMT set (i.e. perhaps because the voters are polarized into two sides, and with one side being majority-preferred to the other), and therefore these methods will be more [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] in practice than many others.
== Notes ==
"Dominant" refers to pairwise-dominant.
[[Runoff voting]] passes DMT assuming no changes in voter preferences between rounds and that there is only one candidate in the DMT set.
In many voting methods that pass DMT, if there are two DMT-like sets (i.e. over 1/3rd of voters [[solidly support]] Democrats and over 1/3rd for Republicans, with the Democrat solid coalition being pairwise-dominant), then one of the candidates in each set will be the winner and runner-up (i.e. a Democrat will win and a Republican will be the runner-up).
== References ==
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