Majority: Difference between revisions

*'''Consensusconsensus''' usually means complete agreement or "all voters"

Many methods claim to elect the "majority winner" or work by "majority rule". However, [[Condorcet's paradox]] tells us thatraises this is complicatedissue: with some groups of voters, no matter which candidate wins, ''some'' majority of the voters will prefer a different candidate. Below is a list of criterion, in ascending order of strictness, which could be called "majority rule" in some sense.

In pseudomajorityweak majority methods (like plurality and range voting), a given majority of the electorate '''can''' coordinate their intentions and decide the winner, but this merely postpones the question of how they do this. The stronger majority methods not only enable firmly coordinated majorities to assert themselves, but they allow un-coordinated majorities to '''reveal''' themselves, without any need for prior coordination. I think that votingVoting methods that facilitate this process of revelation are considered superior to those that do not.

The remaining three categories allow mutual majorities to reveal themselves (in the absence of a self-defeating strategy by supporters of this majority). Strong majority rule methods not only reveal mutual majorities, but they reveal [[minimal dominant setsset]]s and Condorcet winners (in the absence of a severe [[burying strategy]]). This is considered especially valuable because it means revealing possible compromises on divisive issues, thus avoiding a lot of political polarization and strife.

Methods which pass criterion 1 only include [[First-past-the-post electoral system|Plurality]], [[approval voting|Approval]], [[Cardinal Ratings]], and the [[Borda count]]. Although it is always '''possible''' in these systems for a coordinated majority to elect their preferred candidate, the coordination problem canmay be difficult. For example, take an electorate with preferences as follows:

31 A > B > C [[Election Model Notation | *]]