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*'''Criterion 1:''' If a majority of the electorate coordinates their efforts, they can assure that a given candidate is elected, or that another given candidate is not elected.
*'''Criterion 2:''' [[Mutual majority criterion]]
*'''Criterion 3:''' [[Condorcet criterion]]
*'''Criterion 4:''' Minimal dominant set ([[Smith set|Smith]], GeTChA) efficiency
*'''Criterion 1 only:''' Pseudomajority methods.
*'''Criteria 1 and 2 only:''' Weak majority rule methods.
*'''Criteria 1, 2, and 3:''' Intermediate majority rule methods.
*'''Criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4:''' Strong majority rule methods.
*'''Pseudomajority methods:''' [[Plurality]], [[Approval voting |approval]], [[Cardinal Ratings | range voting]], [[Borda count|Borda]]
*'''Weak majority rule methods:''' single-winner [[Single transferable vote|STV]]
*'''Intermediate majority rule methods:''' [[Minmax|Minimax]] (aka Simpson-Kramer, PC, etc.), [[Nanson]], [[Black]], etc.
*'''Strong majority rule methods:''' [[ranked pairs]], [[beatpath]], [[river]], cardinal pairwise (assuming that a strong-majority base method is used)
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In pseudo-majority methods (like plurality and range voting), a given majority of the electorate '''can''' coordinate their intentions and decide the winner, but this merely postpones the question of how they do this. The stronger majority methods not only enable firmly coordinated majorities to assert themselves, but they allow un-coordinated majorities to '''reveal''' themselves, without any need for prior coordination. Voting methods that facilitate this process of revelation are considered superior to those that do not.
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