User:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Negative vote-counting approach for pairwise counting: Difference between revisions
User:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Negative vote-counting approach for pairwise counting (view source)
Revision as of 01:53, 5 December 2020
, 3 years agono edit summary
No edit summary |
|||
Line 591:
===Alternative ways to frame negative pairwise counting===
An alternative way to do the negative approach, which is more similar to the regular approach, is to, when candidate B is explicitly ranked below A on a ballot, instead of counting -1 votes for B>A, count 1 vote for A>B, and later on, when the math is done, the number of votes for B>A is the number of ballots ranking B minus the number of votes for A>B. In other words, a part of the regular pairwise counting approach is used, but only in matchups where both candidates are explicitly ranked by the voter (i.e. a voter who voted A>B and left C unranked would have their vote for A>B counted, but not their vote for A>C, because later on it will be inferred that they must have preferred A to C by virtue of having ranked A but not C).
===Inspiration===▼
[[Approval voting]] can be thought of as a [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] where, when a voter approves a candidate, they are assumed to vote for them in every head-to-head matchup (see [[Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet method]]). Further, approving a candidate can be thought of as ranking them 1st, while disapproving a candidate can be thought of as ranking them last. Given that connection, and that in Approval voting, the vote-counting is done by counting the number of ballots that approve/mark a candidate, rather than by harder [[pairwise counting]], it is clear that a similar counting procedure could be applied to pairwise counting itself. The only complexity is that when voters rank candidates, they are allowed to express that they don't prefer certain candidates in certain matchups; thus, negative votes are necessary to communicate that lack of preference for specific matchups. ▼
This has the advantage of, when every voter does [[bullet voting]], being counted exactly like an [[FPTP]] election (one mark per ballot for the candidate it marked), which also shows that FPTP can be thought of as a constrained form of Approval. ▼
===Comprehensive example===
Line 839 ⟶ 844:
=== Independence of unranked candidates===
The negative approach doesn't require additional marks to be made for a given ballot when candidates are added to the election that that ballot doesn't vote for. For example, at most 3 marks need be made for a voter whose ballot is A>B, regardless of whether there are 2 candidates in the election or 100.
▲===Inspiration===
▲[[Approval voting]] can be thought of as a [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] where, when a voter approves a candidate, they are assumed to vote for them in every head-to-head matchup (see [[Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet method]]). Further, approving a candidate can be thought of as ranking them 1st, while disapproving a candidate can be thought of as ranking them last. Given that connection, and that in Approval voting, the vote-counting is done by counting the number of ballots that approve/mark a candidate, rather than by harder [[pairwise counting]], it is clear that a similar counting procedure could be applied to pairwise counting itself. The only complexity is that when voters rank candidates, they are allowed to express that they don't prefer certain candidates in certain matchups; thus, negative votes are necessary to communicate that lack of preference for specific matchups.
▲This has the advantage of, when every voter does [[bullet voting]], being counted exactly like an [[FPTP]] election (one mark per ballot for the candidate it marked), which also shows that FPTP can be thought of as a constrained form of Approval.
== See also ==
| |||