Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval: Difference between revisions

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It fails [[Strategic nomination|Clone-Winner]], the [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]], [[Participation criterion|Participation]], the [[Majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]].
It fails [[Strategic nomination|Clone-Winner]], the [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]], [[Participation criterion|Participation]], the [[Majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]].

==Links==
*[http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-June/016327.html Method is first proposed on EM, with properties proven (Jun 21 2005)]
*[http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-June/016334.html Mike Ossipoff names the method]


''Work in progress.''
''Work in progress.''

Revision as of 23:46, 19 August 2005

Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval or MDDA is a method devised by Kevin Venzke for the purpose of showing that the Favorite Betrayal criterion, Strategy-Free criterion, and Strong Defensive Strategy criterion are mutually compatible. The name was given by Mike Ossipoff.

Another method with these properties is Majority Approval, Minimum Pairwise Opposition.

Procedure

The voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The candidates explicitly ranked are considered approved by that voter.

A candidate is dominated if more than half of the voters rank some other candidate strictly above him.

All dominated candidates are eliminated, unless this would eliminate all the candidates.

Of remaining candidates, the one approved by the most voters is elected.

Criteria

MDDA satisfies the Favorite Betrayal criterion, Strategy-Free criterion, the Strong Defensive Strategy criterion (and Minimal Defense criterion), monotonicity, and (check this) the Plurality criterion.

It fails Clone-Winner, the Generalized Strategy-Free criterion, the Condorcet criterion, the Smith criterion, Participation, the Majority criterion for solid coalitions, and Later-no-harm.

Links

Work in progress.