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Definite Majority Choice: Difference between revisions
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Since the diagonal cells in the Condorcet pairwise matrix are usually left blank, those locations can be used to store each candidate's Approval point score.
We call a candidate [[Techniques_of_method_design#Defeats_and_defeat_strength|
To determine the winner
# Eliminate all definitively defeated candidates.
# The winner is the single candidate who pairwise defeats (wins head-to-head contests with) all other candidates in the
DMC always selects the [[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet Winner]], if one exists, and otherwise selects a member of the [[Smith set]]. Step 1 has the effect of successively eliminating the least approved candidate in the Smith set and then recalculating the new Smith set
DMC has some interesting properties:
* The DMC winner has the lowest total approval score of any candidate in the Definite Majority set.
* When defeat strength is measured by the approval of the defeating candidate, there is only one possible immune method, namely DMC.
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