Condorcet//Approval: Difference between revisions
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If a voter ranks A>B>C>D>E, and approves only A and B, but C, D, and E are the only candidates in the Smith Set, then this voter would have no influence over who wins in the Smith Set in Smith//Approval. Thus, a modification could be that every voter is assumed to approve their favorite candidate(s) in the Smith Set. Alternatively, if this voter had approved A, B, and C, and all 3 of them were the only candidates in the Smith Set, then again they'd have no influence over which Smith Set candidate wins. So it's also possible to assume every voter disapproves their least favorite(s) In the Smith Set.
Condorcet-Approval hybrids are a specific case of Condorcet-Score hybrids, such as [[Smith//Score]].
One thing that may work in favor of Condorcet-cardinal hybrids as opposed to other Condorcet methods is that the cycle resolution is put more into the voter's hands i.e. it is more intuitive to elect the candidate with the greatest overall support as explicitly indicated by the voters than to run more complex algorithms to determine the winner.
== See also ==
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