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Condorcet//Approval: Difference between revisions

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[See [[:File:Smith--Approval procedure.png|File:Smith--Approval procedure.png]] for a visual look at the procedure]]
 
'''Condorcet//Approval''' or '''C//A''' is an election method by which the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the [[Approval voting|approval]] winner is elected. Approval could be specified in various ways. The double-slash notation signifies that one eliminates all losers of the first step before performing the second step. It is also possible to limit contenders to members of the Smith or Schwartz set, resulting in '''Smith//Approval''' or '''Schwartz//Approval'''.
 
When approval is implemented such that it isn't possible to rank some candidate X over anotheran approved candidate Y without also approving candidate X, Condorcet//Approval and similar methods have good burial resistance.
 
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== Smith//Approval ==
 
The approval winner may be limited to the [[Smith set]]. This variation perforce satisfies the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]] and the [[Majority criterion for solid coalitions]]. It satisfies [[strategic nomination|clone independence]] at least when clones are defined such that every voter approves either all or no members of a clone set.
 
== Explicit, Fully Ranked Smith//Approval ==
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Condorcet-Approval hybrids are a specific case of Condorcet-Score hybrids, such as [[Smith//Score]].
 
One thing that may work in favor of Condorcet-cardinal hybrids as opposed to other Condorcet methods is that the cycle resolution is impler and put more into the voter's hands i.e. it is more intuitive to elect the candidate with the greatest overall support as explicitly indicated by the voters than to run more complex algorithms to determine the winner.
== See also ==
 
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