Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
→Systems which claim to evade Arrow's Criteria: "activists"? o_O Sorry if this is too bold, but it doesn't seem like a particularly controversial thing to claim
Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (→Systems which claim to evade Arrow's Criteria: "activists"? o_O Sorry if this is too bold, but it doesn't seem like a particularly controversial thing to claim) |
||
Line 29:
[[MCA|MCA-P]], as a rated rather than ranked system, violates only unrestricted domain. A system which arbitrarily chose two candidates to go into a runoff would violate only sovereignty. [[Random ballot]] violates only non-dictatorship. None of the methods described on this wiki violate only monotonicity. The [[Schulze method]] violates only independence of irrelevant alternatives, although it actually satisfies the similar [[ISDA|independence of Smith-dominated alternatives]] criterion.
==Systems which
Arrow's theorem only applies to [[Ordinal Voting|ordinal voting]] and not [[cardinal voting]]. It is, therefore, possible for several cardinal systems to pass all three fairness criteria.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1086/259845| issn = 0022-3808| volume = 79| issue = 6| pages = 1397–1402| last = Ng| first = Y. K.| title = The Possibility of a Paretian Liberal: Impossibility Theorems and Cardinal Utility| journal = Journal of Political Economy| accessdate = 2020-03-20| date = 1971-11-01| url = https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/259845| quote=In the present stage of the discussion on the problem of social choice, it should be common knowledge that the General Impossibility Theorem holds because only the ordinal preferences is or can be taken into account. If the intensity of preference or cardinal utility can be known or is reflected in social choice, the paradox of social choice can be solved|via=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.2307/138144| issn = 0315-4890| volume = 18| issue = 2| pages = 195–200| last1 = Kemp| first1 = Murray| last2 = Asimakopulos| first2 = A.| title = A Note on “Social Welfare Functions” and Cardinal Utility*| journal = Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique| accessdate = 2020-03-20| date = 1952-05-01| url = https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-economics-and-political-science-revue-canadienne-de-economiques-et-science-politique/article/note-on-social-welfare-functions-and-cardinal-utility/653F2AEF0D2372DDE202BC7C3B0A231F| quote =The abandonment of Condition 3 makes it possible to formulate a procedure for arriving at a social choice. Such a procedure is described below|via=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1007/BF00126382| issn = 1573-7187| volume = 11| issue = 3| pages = 289–317| last = Harsanyi| first = John C.| title = Bayesian decision theory, rule utilitarianism, and Arrow's impossibility theorem| journal = Theory and Decision| accessdate = 2020-03-20| date = 1979-09-01| url = http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00126382| quote=It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates — avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is ''unavailable'' in Arrow's original framework..|via=}}</ref> The typical example is [[score voting]] but there are also several [[Multi-Member System |multi-winner systems]]{{clarify}} which purport to pass all three of Arrow's original criteria. Additionally, there are cardinal systems which do not pass all criteria, but this is not due to Arrow's theorem; for example [[Ebert's Method]] fails [[Monotonicity]].
However, subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making with multiple options will have some level of [[strategic voting]]. As a result of this much of the work of social choice theorists is to find out what types of [[strategic voting]] a system is susceptible to and the level of susceptibility for each. For example [[Single Member system | Single Member systems]] are not susceptible to [[Free riding]].
==See also==
*[[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]]
*[[Condorcet paradox]]
*[[Balinski–Young theorem]]
==
<references />
==External links==
*
*
*
*
▲* [https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/1123r3.html Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem]
▲* [https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/ucsdec/qt96n108ts.html A Pedagogical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem]
▲* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050405113254/http://www.electionmethods.org/Arrow.htm Discussion of Arrow’s Theorem and Condorcet’s method]
▲* [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arrows-theorem/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
▲* [https://www.electionscience.org/commentary-analysis/voting-theory-podcast-2012-10-06-interview-with-nobel-laureate-dr-kenneth-arrow/ Interview with Dr Arrow]
[[Category:Voting theory]]
{{fromwikipedia}}
| |||