Talk:Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
→Finding EPOV on Arrow
Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) |
|||
Line 81:
:::: [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] To be clear a relative scale is when you put your favourite(s) to MAX_SCORE and everybody you do not like to 0, right? And your claim is that there is an extension of Arrow's theorem which would apply to [[Score voting]] if that was true. I would think this is always true so I would be very interested in such a proof. Do you have a reference? --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 22:27, 20 March 2020 (UTC)
::::: I think Kristomun is talking about something like a 3-candidate Condorcet cycle, where no matter who Score elects, if one candidate drops out, then if voters normalize between the two remaining candidates, then you get majority rule. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 22:47, 20 March 2020 (UTC)
| |||