Score voting: Difference between revisions
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Score's satisfaction of the above-mentioned property (max of 1 vote of differentiation in a beatpath) is one of the reasons it nominally passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives where Condorcet methods don't, as the only time those methods fail it is when no [[Beats-all winner|beats-all winner]] exists, and forcing Condorcet methods to satisfy that property ensures a beats-or-ties-all winner will exist.
== Notes ==
Score voting can be simulated with Approval ballots if every voter votes probabilistically according to their utility value for each candidate i.e. a voter who thinks a candidate is a 6 out of 10 would use a dice or other randomizing device to approve that candidate with only 60% probability. With this approach, the Approval voting winner will probabilistically be the Score voting winner so long as there are many voters. In some sense, cardinal utility is tied to randomness in that it is often considered a better measure than ordinal utility when analyzing decision-making under uncertainty.
== References ==
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