Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions
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{{cleanup|reason=This article is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states an editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic.}}
(Note: This is not actually a [[Condorcet method]]. It is a Condorcet method only when using a modified definition of what a Condorcet method is.)▼
'''Symmetrical ICT''' is a voting method designed by Michael Ossipoff. <!-- when? link to EM? --> It is based on Kevin Venzke's concept of "Improved Condorcet", which is a modification of pairwise comparison logic that enables methods to pass the [[favorite betrayal criterion]] at the cost of sometimes failing the [[Condorcet criterion]].
After this description and definition of Symmetrical ICT, I'll say a few words of what it implies for the compatibility of FBC and Condorcet's Criterion.▼
==Definition==
ICT stands for "Improved-Condorcet-Top". The idea for Improved Condorcet is from Kevin Venzke. Improved Condorcet meets FBC. Then, later, Chris Benham proposed completion by top-count, to achieve "defection-resistance", avoidance of the [[chicken dilemma]]. Chris had a long name for his method, but I called it "Improved-Condorcet-Top", in keeping with Kevin's naming.▼
▲(Note: This is not actually a [[Condorcet method]]. It is a Condorcet method only when using a modified definition of what a Condorcet method is.)
I later proposed that the Improved Condorcet improvement be done at bottom-end as well, to almost achieve compliance with Later-No-Help, which would achieve additional easing and simplification of strategy need.▼
(X>Y) means the number of ballots ranking X over Y.▼
But the big improvements were those of Kevin and Chris.▼
(Y>X) means the number of ballots ranking Y over X.▼
I call my version Symmetrical ICT. ▼
(X=Y)T means the number of ballots ranking X and Y in 1st place.▼
(X=Y)B means the number of ballots ranking X and Y at bottom, i.e. not ranking either X or Y above anyone else.▼
----▼
Then X beats Y if:
* p(X,Y) and not p(Y, X), or
* p(X,Y) and p(Y, X) and (X>Y) > (Y>X).
The winner is chosen as follows:
== Improved Condorcet ==
▲(X>Y) means the number of ballots ranking X over Y.
Condorcet methods usually have a low but nonzero rate of [[favorite betrayal]] failures. <!-- ref EM post --> '''Improved Condorcet''' is a modification of pairwise comparisons in an otherwise Condorcet-compliant method to turn absolute Conrocet compliance and a low rate of [[FBC]] failure into absolute FBC compliance and a low rate of [[Condorcet criterion]] failures.
▲(Y>X) means the number of ballots ranking Y over X.
==History==
▲(X=Y)T means the number of ballots ranking X and Y in 1st place.
▲ICT stands for "Improved-Condorcet-Top". The idea for Improved Condorcet is from Kevin Venzke. Improved Condorcet meets FBC. Then, later, Chris Benham proposed completion by top-count, to achieve "defection-resistance", avoidance of the [[chicken dilemma]]. Chris had a long name for his method, but I called it "Improved-Condorcet-Top", in keeping with Kevin's naming.
▲(X=Y)B means the number of ballots ranking X and Y at bottom.
▲I later proposed that the Improved Condorcet improvement be done at bottom-end as well, to almost achieve compliance with Later-No-Help, which would achieve additional easing and simplification of strategy need.
▲But the big improvements were those of Kevin and Chris.
▲X beats Y iff (X>Y) + (X=Y)B > (Y>X) + (X=Y)T
▲I call my version Symmetrical ICT.
▲----
<!-- Start of Michael's original article/essay -->
▲After
▲1. If only one candidate is unbeaten, then s/he wins.
▲2. If everyone or no one is unbeaten, then the winner is the candidate
▲3. If some, but not all, candidates are unbeaten, then the winner is
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