Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions

'''Here is a definition of Symmetrical ICT:'''

'''Favorite-Burial Criterion (FBC):'''

'''A few improved properties of ICT and Symmetrical ICT.:'''

Well, I take that back: There is one way in which ICT and Symmetrical ICT improve on ApperovalApproval, even in a u/a election. They automatically avoid the chicken dilemma, as said above. The chicken dilemma is easily dealt with in Approval and Score, and, for a number of other reasons too, isn't really a problem with Approval and Score. Only a nuisance. But it's nice that ICT and Symmetrical ICT automatically get rid of that nuisance. You don't improve on Approval without doing that. Don't even consider a rank-method that doesn't automatically avoid the chicken dilemma.

LNHe says that, when you've voted for some candidates on your ballot (you vote for a candidate if you vote him/her over someone), then you don't need to vote for moreadditional candidates on that ballot in order to help theas onesmuch as you've alreadycan votedthe candidates for all thatwhom you've canalready voted.

In Symmetrical ICT, if a voter had sufficiently detailed and reliable predictive information, s/he could probably sometimes gain by ranking some unacceptable candidates, more winnable ones over less winnable ones. But there's no such information available. One thing that Symmetrical ICT guarantees is that, by leaving some particular two candidates unranked, you're doing everything that you can reasonably do to cause some one of them (either one of them) to be beaten by the other.