Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
It is important that we do not confuse Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem
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Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) (It is important that we do not confuse Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem) |
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: "Tactical voting is fine in theory and as an intellectual discussion in the drawing room or living rooms around the country, but when you actually get to polling day and you have to vote against your principles, then it is much harder to do".
While most agree that tactical voting is generally a problem, there are some cases when a strictly limited amount of it may bring about an more democratic result. Since the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] shows that all systems are vulnerable to tactical voting it become a question of which kinds of tactical voting are encouraged by each system more than the existence of it at all. For [[Ranked voting]] systems, [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]] proves that any voting system is arguably undemocratic in at least some case. However, tactical voting may be used to
The problem is that such tactical voting would tend to overshoot and give undesired results. This greatly complicates the comparative analysis of voting systems. If tactical voting were to become significant, the perceived "advantages" of a given voting system could turn into disadvantages - and, more surprisingly, vice versa.
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