Talk:Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
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::: However, as I'd reiterate, an important point is that Range only passes if people don't calibrate their scales relatively. In the pizza election, they (presumably) have an absolute scale, but any normalization that reduces a two-candidate elction to a majority vote makes the procedure (plus implicit normalization) fail IIA. This point is probably stronger against Approval than Range: an absolute scale calibration implies that there can be voters in an Approval election who would approve every candidate or none of them, something which is very hard to imagine would happen in a real election. This is reminiscent of the Approval/Range "manual DSV" sleight of hand that I've talked about on EM. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 17:50, 20 March 2020 (UTC)
:::: [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] To be clear a relative scale is when you put your favourite(s) to MAX_SCORE and everybody you do not like to 0, right? And your claim is that there is an extension of Arrow's theorem which would apply to [[Score voting]] if that was true. I would think this is always true so I would be very interested in such a proof. Do you have a reference? --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 22:27, 20 March 2020 (UTC)
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