Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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: Woodall states that DAC passes participation in his article "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules". [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 09:56, 8 February 2020 (UTC)
:: I'd guess the reasoning for why consistency and participation are equivalent is that if you have a group of voters before and after adding in a voter, participation requires that voter not to get a worse result from voting, while consistency considers the voter a second "group" of voters who, when their vote fuses with the first group, shouldn't change the winner if they personally voted for the winner as their 1st choice. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 16:10, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
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:::: I didn't have time to correct my previous answer. The IIA that is satisfied concerns the set (IIA*), that is:
:::: IIA: A is preferred to B. If I add C
:::: IIA*: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X and B, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.▼
:::: - B is outside the Smith set: Smith set = X and the candidate added
:::: - B is inside the Smith set: adding C could not get B out of the Smith set; at most C could enter the Smith set. In the Smith set the score voting is applied to choose the winner [[User:Aldo Tragni|Aldo Tragni]] ([[User talk:Aldo Tragni|talk]]) 14:00, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
▲:::: IIA*: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate than the candidates in X and B, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.
::::: That is, as best as I can tell, ISDA (Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_Smith-dominated_alternatives. Also, just as a note, if the "eliminate the worst, redistribute points" procedure is done to the candidates within the Smith Set, that seems equivalent to [[Smith//IRV]], while if you're correct about this being Score Voting in the Smith Set, then it's equivalent to [[Smith//Score]]. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 16:10, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
▲:::: - B is outside the Smith set: Smith set = X and the candidate added A would lose both against B and X leaving B (and A) outside the Smith set.
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