Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions

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:::: I didn't have time to correct my previous answer. The IIA that is satisfied concerns the set (IIA*), that is:
 
:::: IIA: A is preferred to B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate than A and B, then A continues to be preferred over B.
 
:::: IIA*: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X and B, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.
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::::: That is, as best as I can tell, ISDA (Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_Smith-dominated_alternatives. Also, just as a note, if the "eliminate the worst, redistribute points" procedure is done to the candidates within the Smith Set, that seems equivalent to [[Smith//IRV]], while if you're correct about this being Score Voting in the Smith Set, then it's equivalent to [[Smith//Score]]. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 16:10, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
 
:::::: Yes, basically it's one [[Smith//Score]] that adds a couple of rules to handle the multi-winner case. [[User:Aldo Tragni|Aldo Tragni]] ([[User talk:Aldo Tragni|talk]]) 19:33, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
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