Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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:: You're right, in the Smith set I have to apply extra rules to reduce it in order to satisfy the IIA; specifically I have to reduce the possible condorcet paradox to a group of only 3 best candidates in a cyclical path; I'm looking for a definition for this but for now the maximum I have found is Smith set.
::: You forgot to sign your post, btw. But look, here's an example of how every voting method that always elects the majority's 1st choice has to fail IIA:
::: 25 A>B>C
::: 40 B>C>A
::: 35 C>A>B
::: Your voting method guaranteeably elects one of these candidates. Now, if we eliminate one of the losing candidates, we find that there's another candidate who is a majority's 1st choice (if A wins, eliminate B who lost, and now C wins. If B wins, eliminate C and A wins. If C wins, eliminate A and B wins), and so they must win, violating IIA. It is a very specific criterion, and I think you're possibly discussing something completely new. But unfortunately, the only reasonable voting methods I'm aware of that pass IIA are Approval and Score Voting, and that too only under contrived conditions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_irrelevant_alternatives#Criticism_of_IIA [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 13:24, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
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