Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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:::: - B is inside the Smith set: adding C could not get B out of the Smith set; at most C could enter the Smith set. In the Smith set the score voting is applied to choose the winner [[User:Aldo Tragni|Aldo Tragni]] ([[User talk:Aldo Tragni|talk]]) 14:00, 9 February 2020 (UTC)
:::: If you assume that in a head-to-head with only one winner, the voter gives the lowest (0) score to the worst candidate and the maximum (100) to the favorite candidate (which is a very realistic hypothesis), then the IIA also fails in Score Voting as in DSV (when the addition of the irrelevant candidate generates condorcent paradox). The AV I think is the only one that really satisfies the IIA, but represents the interests too roughly. The IIA* can always be satisfied by the DSV, while allowing a precise representation of interests.
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