Talk:Dominant mutual third set: Difference between revisions
→Electing a candidate outside the DMT set must be allowed for an honest vote.: new section
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I've removed the part where IRV is sped up by aborting early after finding the DMT winner. This because you need the pairwise matrix to determine if the candidate is a DMT winner, and compiling that pairwise matrix takes a longer time than just running IRV to completion. I've replaced it with a more general statement about potential speedups. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 19:28, 22 May 2020 (UTC)
: I did explicitly write "This never requires more rounds of counting than the regular IRV approach (ignoring the discovery of the [[pairwise comparison matrix]])," Even if you don't want to call it a speedup, why not preserve the example in some form? Part of the reason I prefer to mention that DMT can be used to reduce rounds of counting is because it helps provide a regularity or predictability to these methods, which is important because their fickle order of elimination often makes it hard to understand them. In other words, if there's an IRV election that requires 10 rounds of counting under the regular approach but 5 with DMT, then it's less cognitively burdensome to look at it using the DMT approach. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 21:48, 22 May 2020 (UTC)
== Electing a candidate outside the DMT set must be allowed for an honest vote. ==
I have an small but cleverly composed example:
5 A>D>C
3 B>E>C
2 B>A>C
5 C>E
2 D>E>A
1 D>C>E>B
2 E>B>C
IRV elects B. Condorcet methods, like Copeland, find a Condorcet Winner, electing C.
In addressing the shortcomings of IRV, I have a runoff voting process that will elect E despite Candidate C being the Condorcet winner. If being a Condorcet Winner was an overriding condition of victory, the 3 B > E > C supporters will be extremely reluctant to vote for C. When these three votes change to B>E, there is no Condorcet winner. Voters should not be given any reason to do that. This example demonstrates that a fair voting process must allow itself to fairly count honest opinions as cast on the ballots and accept the possibility that a candidate from outside the Dominant Mutual Third Set can be elected.
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 00:48, 19 December 2023 (UTC)
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