Talk:IRV Prime

Hello, Condorcet and Later-no-harm are incompatible - see proof in Woodall.^[1] Could you run your method through the example provided there and update the article? Kristomun (talk) 09:12, 31 July 2021 (UTC)

Arrow/IIA

As I understand it, the reference to satisfying Arrow's theorem is meant to imply that the method satisfies IIA. But I don't think that's possible.

In a Condorcet cycle like this:

35: A>B>C
30: B>C>A
25: C>A>B

Who wins in IRV Prime? If it's A, then eliminating B (irrelevant candidate) should make C win by majority rule. If it's B, then eliminating C makes A win; and if it's C, then eliminating A makes B win. I may be missing something, though! :-) Kristomun (talk) 22:22, 31 July 2021 (UTC)

↑ D R Woodall, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996

[Woodall-Monotonicity-1] D R Woodall, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996

[1]