Template:Infobox voting method: Difference between revisions
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (add visible field for Mutual majority) |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (change parameter format and example of positive and negative automatic categories) |
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| Yes |
| Yes |
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| No |
| No |
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}} |
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| label2 = Favorite betrayal compliant |
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| data2 = {{#if: {{{favorite-betrayal|}}} |
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| Yes [[Category:Favorite betrayal criterion]] |
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| No [[Category:Fails favorite betrayal criterion]] |
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}} |
}} |
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}}<noinclude> |
}}<noinclude> |
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"Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion": { |
"Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion": { |
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"description": "Does the same candidate always win when candidates not in the Smith set are added or removed from the election?", |
"description": "Does the same candidate always win when candidates not in the Smith set are added or removed from the election?", |
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⚫ | |||
⚫ | |||
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"type": "boolean" |
"type": "boolean" |
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}, |
}, |
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"description": "Does someone from a set of candidates that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win?", |
"description": "Does someone from a set of candidates that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win?", |
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"example": "If a majority of voters are split between several flavors of chocolate ice cream, but agree that any flavor of chocolate is better than any other flavor, then one of the chocolate-type flavors must win.", |
"example": "If a majority of voters are split between several flavors of chocolate ice cream, but agree that any flavor of chocolate is better than any other flavor, then one of the chocolate-type flavors must win.", |
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"favorite-betrayal": { |
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⚫ | |||
"type": "boolean" |
"type": "boolean" |
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} |
} |
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"Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion", |
"Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion", |
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"Later-no-harm criterion", |
"Later-no-harm criterion", |
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"favorite-betrayal", |
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"Favorite Betrayal criterion", |
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"Single-winner reduction", |
"Single-winner reduction", |
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"Party list case" |
"Party list case" |
Revision as of 03:45, 31 March 2020
Condorcet compliant | No |
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Favorite betrayal compliant | No |
An infobox for voting methods
Parameter | Description | Type | Status | |
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title | title | The name of the voting method | Unknown | required |
Utility criterion | Utility criterion | Does the candidate with the greatest utility always win? | Boolean | optional |
Majority criterion | Majority criterion | Does a candidate that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win? | Boolean | optional |
Mutual majority criterion | mutual-majority | Does someone from a set of candidates that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win?
| Boolean | optional |
Condorcet criterion | condorcet | Does the Condorcet winner always win when they exist? | Boolean | optional |
Smith criterion | Smith criterion | Does a candidate from the Smith set always win? | Boolean | optional |
Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Does the same candidate always win when candidates not in the Smith set are added or removed from the election? | Boolean | optional |
Later-no-harm criterion | Later-no-harm criterion | Can a voter hurt one of their more-preferred candidates' chances of winning by indicating a preference for a less-preferred candidate? | Boolean | optional |
Favorite Betrayal criterion | favorite-betrayal | Do voters ever have strategic incentive to indicate they prefer someone who isn't their honest favorite more than their honest favorite? | Boolean | optional |
Single-winner reduction | Single-winner reduction | Which single-winner voting method does this voting method reduce to (become equivalent to) in the single-winner case?
| Page name | optional |
Party list case | Party list case | Which proportional allocation method does this voting method become equivalent to when voters vote on party lines? | Page name | optional |