Template:Infobox voting method: Difference between revisions
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (change parameter format and example of positive and negative automatic categories) |
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| No |
| No |
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| label3 = Favorite betrayal compliant |
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| data3 = {{#if: {{{favorite-betrayal|}}} |
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| Yes [[Category:Favorite betrayal criterion]] |
| Yes [[Category:Favorite betrayal criterion]] |
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| No [[Category:Fails favorite betrayal criterion]] |
| No [[Category:Fails favorite betrayal criterion]] |
Revision as of 03:46, 31 March 2020
Condorcet compliant | No |
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Mutual majority compliant | No |
Favorite betrayal compliant | No |
An infobox for voting methods
Parameter | Description | Type | Status | |
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title | title | The name of the voting method | Unknown | required |
Utility criterion | Utility criterion | Does the candidate with the greatest utility always win? | Boolean | optional |
Majority criterion | Majority criterion | Does a candidate that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win? | Boolean | optional |
Mutual majority criterion | mutual-majority | Does someone from a set of candidates that a majority of voters prefer over all others always win?
| Boolean | optional |
Condorcet criterion | condorcet | Does the Condorcet winner always win when they exist? | Boolean | optional |
Smith criterion | Smith criterion | Does a candidate from the Smith set always win? | Boolean | optional |
Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives criterion | Does the same candidate always win when candidates not in the Smith set are added or removed from the election? | Boolean | optional |
Later-no-harm criterion | Later-no-harm criterion | Can a voter hurt one of their more-preferred candidates' chances of winning by indicating a preference for a less-preferred candidate? | Boolean | optional |
Favorite Betrayal criterion | favorite-betrayal | Do voters ever have strategic incentive to indicate they prefer someone who isn't their honest favorite more than their honest favorite? | Boolean | optional |
Single-winner reduction | Single-winner reduction | Which single-winner voting method does this voting method reduce to (become equivalent to) in the single-winner case?
| Page name | optional |
Party list case | Party list case | Which proportional allocation method does this voting method become equivalent to when voters vote on party lines? | Page name | optional |