Total approval chain climbing: Difference between revisions
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) m (Psephomancy moved page TACC to Total approval chain climbing: prefer written-out names) |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
'''Total approval chain climbing''' ('''TACC''') is a Condorcet completion method using an approval component, invented by Forest Simmons. In the three-candidate case it is equivalent to electing the candidate in the cycle who defeats the approval loser pairwise. The motivation is to reduce burial incentive. |
'''Total approval chain climbing''' ('''TACC''') is a Condorcet completion method using an [[Approval ballot|approval]] component, invented by Forest Simmons. In the three-candidate case it is equivalent to electing the candidate in the cycle who defeats the approval loser pairwise. The motivation is to reduce [[burial]] incentive. |
||
It works as follows:<blockquote>1. Sort the candidates by increasing total approval. |
|||
Thread here: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2014-April/097912.html |
|||
2. Starting with an empty "chain of candidates", consider each candidate in the above order. When the candidate defeats all candidates already in the chain, add her at the top of the chain. The last added candidate wins.</blockquote>Thread here: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2014-April/097912.html |
|||
(Full definition should be added) |
(Full definition should be added) |
||
== Notes == |
|||
TACC and its variants are notable for always electing from the [[Banks set]], a subset of the [[Uncovered set|uncovered set]] and thus the [[Smith set]]. |
|||
{{stub}} |
{{stub}} |
||
Revision as of 07:36, 19 March 2020
Total approval chain climbing (TACC) is a Condorcet completion method using an approval component, invented by Forest Simmons. In the three-candidate case it is equivalent to electing the candidate in the cycle who defeats the approval loser pairwise. The motivation is to reduce burial incentive.
It works as follows:
1. Sort the candidates by increasing total approval. 2. Starting with an empty "chain of candidates", consider each candidate in the above order. When the candidate defeats all candidates already in the chain, add her at the top of the chain. The last added candidate wins.
Thread here: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2014-April/097912.html
(Full definition should be added)
Notes
TACC and its variants are notable for always electing from the Banks set, a subset of the uncovered set and thus the Smith set.
This page is a stub - please add to it.