User:Araucaria: Difference between revisions
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It is important that we not be confused by the false choice that there are only two viewpoints on any issue. This is why it is important that there to be enough candidates in the general election to challenge common wisdom, talking points and the implicit agreement in the two-party duopoly to avoid discussing issues that actually affect us. |
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Monkey Puzzle |
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Instead of our current ([[First Past the Post electoral system|Single vote]]) system, I would prefer a voting method that does not force one to vote for a compromise based on assumptions of what other voters would do. |
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Current favorite Condorcet completion method is [[Definite Majority Choice]]. |
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I currently favor methods that satisfy the [[Favorite betrayal criterion]], such as [[Approval voting]], [[Relevant rating]], [[Majority judgment]] or [[IBIFA]]. I would also be interested in a Condorcet-style method that satisfies or comes close to satisfying the [[Later-no-help criterion]] in order to discourage burying. |
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Send email to araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com. |
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I am interested in [[Proportional Representation]] methods that do not use [[Single Transferable Vote]]. |
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Latest revision as of 19:29, 13 June 2019
It is important that we not be confused by the false choice that there are only two viewpoints on any issue. This is why it is important that there to be enough candidates in the general election to challenge common wisdom, talking points and the implicit agreement in the two-party duopoly to avoid discussing issues that actually affect us.
Instead of our current (Single vote) system, I would prefer a voting method that does not force one to vote for a compromise based on assumptions of what other voters would do.
I currently favor methods that satisfy the Favorite betrayal criterion, such as Approval voting, Relevant rating, Majority judgment or IBIFA. I would also be interested in a Condorcet-style method that satisfies or comes close to satisfying the Later-no-help criterion in order to discourage burying.
I am interested in Proportional Representation methods that do not use Single Transferable Vote.