User:Araucaria: Difference between revisions
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imported>Araucaria (Change "Favorite" to "First Choice") |
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As of 2005, my favorite Condorcet completion method was [[Definite Majority Choice]]. In the interest of expediency, I would favor some kind of transition as follows: |
As of 2005, my favorite Condorcet completion method was [[Definite Majority Choice]]. In the interest of expediency, I would favor some kind of transition as follows: |
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* First Choice plus [[Approval voting|Approval]]: Single First Choice vote, plus [[Approval voting|Approval]] of any number of other candidates. The First Choice is also approved. If no candidate wins >50% of the First Choice votes, elect candidate with highest approval. |
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* First Choice plus [[Range voting]]. Single First Choice as above, plus a score of 0 to 99 can be given to any number of other candidates. Same fallback as above, except total ratings score is used instead of approval. |
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Once a [[Ratings ballot]] |
Once a [[Ratings ballot]] is used, the scores could be tabulated (inferring candidate rankings from their ratings) and reported with 5 different methods for comparison: Top First Choice, [[Range voting]], [[Schulze]], [[Definite Majority Choice]], or [[Cardinal pairwise]] using [[River]]. |
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With familiarity, it would be possible to transition to a more robust voting system. In the case of no candidate winning a majority of the |
With familiarity, it would eventually be possible to transition to a more robust voting system. In the case of no candidate winning a majority of the First Choice votes, we could select from one of the other four robust methods at random to introduce unpredictability (thus avoiding [[Arrow's impossibility theorem|Arrow's paradox]]). Since all four methods have similar sincere voting strategies but different strategies in the case of cycles, it would give an incentive to vote by sincere preference instead of trying to game the system. |
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I would prefer to avoid primary elections. However, they may continue to be required during a transition period. If that is the case, I would recommend using |
I would prefer to avoid primary elections. However, they may continue to be required during a transition period. If that is the case, I would recommend using |
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* First Choice plus Approval. As above. Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, comprising the candidate with highest First Choice totals (single vote winner), most-approved, and second-highest approved, plus any other candidates with higher approval than the Single-Vote winner. The main advantage of this is simplicity, plus it would be a marked improvement of the Top-Two Louisiana-style primary using Single Vote --- voters would be assured that a good selection of alternative candidates would face the Single-vote winner in the general election. |
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* First Choice plus [[Range voting]]. As above. Narrow field to at least 2 candidates, who would include the Single Vote winner, Approval winner, second-highest approved, plus any other candidate with a pairwise [[Beatpath|beatpath]] to the Approval winner. The improvement here over First Choice plus Approval would be that the entire [[Smith set]] (plus first- and second-place approval winners) would be included in the slate of candidates going to the general election. |
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You can contact me at ''araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com''. |
You can contact me at ''araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com''. |
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== Election Reform Priorities == |
== Election Reform Priorities == |
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My highly opinionated views on what can be done to improve the US form of government: |
My highly opinionated views on what can be done to improve the US form of government: |
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=== Trust in the process === |
=== Trust in the process === |
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Before anything else, we need to trust the mechanics of voting: |
Before anything else, we need to trust the mechanics of voting: |
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