User:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Big page of ideas: Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
| Line 148: | Line 148: | ||
A voter's rated pairwise preference can be partially expressed as a ranked preference augmented with margins. So, for example, A 30%>B 50%>C 100%>D 100% (which could also be written as A 0.3>B..., or A 40% to 10%>B 80% to 30%, etc.) would indicate the voter gave a 30% margin to A>B, a 50% margin to B>C (implying, by transitivity, that they gave at least a 50% margin to A>C as well), etc. This doesn't tell you how the voter scored matchups involving candidates who are more than one rank apart, however. |
A voter's rated pairwise preference can be partially expressed as a ranked preference augmented with margins. So, for example, A 30%>B 50%>C 100%>D 100% (which could also be written as A 0.3>B..., or A 40% to 10%>B 80% to 30%, etc.) would indicate the voter gave a 30% margin to A>B, a 50% margin to B>C (implying, by transitivity, that they gave at least a 50% margin to A>C as well), etc. This doesn't tell you how the voter scored matchups involving candidates who are more than one rank apart, however. |
||
==== Criterion compliances ==== |
|||
If using rated pairwise in a Condorcet method: |
|||
* The majority criterion and mutual majority criterion are passed if the majority indicates maximal preference for all of their preferred candidates in matchups against all candidates they don't prefer. |
|||
* Condorcet and Smith criteria are passed if the voters who prefer a candidate in the Smith set over a candidate not in the Smith set always maximize their preference. |
|||
=== Connection between Condorcet, Smith set, and Asset === |
=== Connection between Condorcet, Smith set, and Asset === |
||