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One way to understand, Condorcet, Smith, and [[Asset voting]]: imagine you're having a discussion where you have to discuss one option at a time. So, one option, at any given point in time, "dominates the discussion". However, people can bring up other options one at a time, and then depending on the mood of the group, the group decides to discuss one option or the other. The group may discuss options for as long as they like, and can discuss the same options multiple times. If you start off with an option that is not in the Smith set, what you'll find is that if everyone is maximally intransigent i.e. doesn't yield any ground, then the majority-preferred option between any two options will always begin to dominate the discussion, resulting eventually in a matchup between a non-Smith option and Smith option where the Smith option must win. Now, because the Smith option is preferred by more people than any non-Smith option, a non-Smith option simply can't return to the discussion i.e. all of the Smith options will beat it any time a non-Smith option comes up for consideration. If people have weaker preferences, or don't vote in all of the matchups, this can bias the Smith set itself to being more utilitarian i.e. a minority can start to win certain matchups, resulting in the group trending closer to preferring the Score winner than the Condorcet winner or the Smith set candidates.
One way to understand, Condorcet, Smith, and [[Asset voting]]: imagine you're having a discussion where you have to discuss one option at a time. So, one option, at any given point in time, "dominates the discussion". However, people can bring up other options one at a time, and then depending on the mood of the group, the group decides to discuss one option or the other. The group may discuss options for as long as they like, and can discuss the same options multiple times. If you start off with an option that is not in the Smith set, what you'll find is that if everyone is maximally intransigent i.e. doesn't yield any ground, then the majority-preferred option between any two options will always begin to dominate the discussion, resulting eventually in a matchup between a non-Smith option and Smith option where the Smith option must win. Now, because the Smith option is preferred by more people than any non-Smith option, a non-Smith option simply can't return to the discussion i.e. all of the Smith options will beat it any time a non-Smith option comes up for consideration. If people have weaker preferences, or don't vote in all of the matchups, this can bias the Smith set itself to being more utilitarian i.e. a minority can start to win certain matchups, resulting in the group trending closer to preferring the Score winner than the Condorcet winner or the Smith set candidates.

It is arguable whether a voter can have maximal preferences between more than one transitive pair of candidates. Utilitarianism says if you maximally prefer A to B, then you must not prefer B to C, while Condorcet says you can for as many pairs as you like. An interesting method that goes one step away from utilitarianism towards Condorcet is "2-slot/tiered Smith//Approval": the voter may rank each candidate either 1st, 2nd, or last, and may approve either only their 1st choices, or also their 2nd choices. With only 1 tier, this would reduce to regular Approval voting.