User:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Big page of ideas

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Some ideas:

Here are some how-to guides on using different voting methods for your own elections.

A slightly modified version of Schulze:

In general, any Condorcet method can be done with either rated or ranked ballots. That means you give every voter the ability to number all of the candidates either on a scale or from 1st to last.

When trying to find the result, start by, for each ballot, adding one vote in support of whichever candidate the voter preferred in every possible pairwise matchup. So, for example, a voter who voted A>B>C is treated as giving one vote to A>B, one to B>C, and one to A>C. This means that you'll have, for every pair of candidates, two values to store: the number of voters who prefer the first over the second, and vice versa.

Once you've done this, you'll want to find the margin of victory for every matchup. This tells you which candidate got more votes than the other in that matchup. Once you've found the margin, look for a single candidate who beats all others. If there is none, look for two candidates who beat all others (except possibly each other). Keep looking at more and more candidates until you find a beats-all group. This is the Smith set.

Now, eliminate everyone not in the Smith set. If there was only one candidate in the Smith set, they win, and if there are multiple candidates who tied (i.e. they don't beat each other), then they're tied. Otherwise, decide on your preferred measure of defeat strength (winning votes will be used for this example). Find the candidate who got the fewest votes in their favor in one of their victories against another candidate. Now, ignore this victory, treating it instead as a victory for both candidates. Now, repeat the process of finding the Smith set; you may be lucky and find that the group can be shrunken because some candidate who earlier lost to another now "wins" after ignoring their loss. Repeat this process until the winner is found.

Smith//Score:

Find the Smith set. Whoever has the most points in it wins.

Smith//Approval:

Find the Smith set. Whoever has the most approvals in it wins.