Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions
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(→Rationale and Critique: more specific about when it's "harmful". It's still clearly a step up from reweighted/satisfaction methods.) |
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# Following the same example, if a rating of 3 out of 5 has more than 3/5 the power to elect a candidate in the first place, the strategic incentive is to give lower ratings, so that the amount of your ballot that is used up when a candidate is elected is less than the voting power you exerted in electing them. |
# Following the same example, if a rating of 3 out of 5 has more than 3/5 the power to elect a candidate in the first place, the strategic incentive is to give lower ratings, so that the amount of your ballot that is used up when a candidate is elected is less than the voting power you exerted in electing them. |
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This leads some voting theorists, such as Jameson Quinn, to consider vote unitarity an actively harmful criterion. |
This leads some voting theorists, such as Jameson Quinn, to consider vote unitarity an actively harmful criterion, as opposed to otherwise-similar methods which tend to allocate votes more fully. |
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== Compliant Voting Methods == |
== Compliant Voting Methods == |