Approval voting: Difference between revisions

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(Add paragraph on IIA not necessarily implying a lack of spoiler effect; also do some minor cleanup.)
m (Remove empty (undefined) criterion, and relabel paragraph. Move some criterion compliances to the criterion compliances paragraph.)
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*Knoxville: 32 total votes
*Knoxville: 32 total votes


==Criterion compliances==
==Criteria Passed==
Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections.
Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections.

Approval voting satisfies a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]]. It also satisfies the [[participation criterion]], the [[Consistency Criterion]], the [[summability criterion]], the [[Weak Defensive Strategy criterion]], [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], and the [[non-compulsory support criterion]].


==Potential for tactical voting==
==Potential for tactical voting==
Approval voting passes a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]], in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning. Indeed, there is never a reason for a voter to [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a candidate X without voting for all candidates he or she prefers to candidate X. Approval voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[participation criterion]], the [[Consistency Criterion]], the [[summability criterion]], the [[Weak Defensive Strategy criterion]], [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], the [[Non-compulsory support criterion]] and the [[Independence of equivalent candidates criterion]].
Approval voting passes a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]], in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning. Indeed, there is never a reason for a voter to [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a candidate X without voting for all candidates he or she prefers to candidate X.


While [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] usually implies a complete lack of a spoiler effect, in Approval voting the implication does not necessarily hold. If honest voters are expected to translate their preferences into an Approval ballot by making use of a particular rule, the rule may lead the election outcome to depend on what non-winning candidates were present. See [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Implications|implications of IIA]].
While [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] usually implies a complete lack of a spoiler effect, in Approval voting the implication does not necessarily hold. If honest voters are expected to translate their preferences into an Approval ballot by making use of a particular rule, the rule may lead the election outcome to depend on what non-winning candidates were present. See [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Implications|implications of IIA]].