Approval voting: Difference between revisions
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(Add paragraph on IIA not necessarily implying a lack of spoiler effect; also do some minor cleanup.) |
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*Knoxville: 32 total votes |
*Knoxville: 32 total votes |
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==Criterion compliances== |
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==Criteria Passed== |
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Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections. |
Approval voting satisfies the [[unanimous consensus criterion]] and [[greatest possible consensus criterion]]. It is strongly promoted by advocates of consensus democracy for single-winner elections. |
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Approval voting satisfies a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]]. It also satisfies the [[participation criterion]], the [[Consistency Criterion]], the [[summability criterion]], the [[Weak Defensive Strategy criterion]], [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], and the [[non-compulsory support criterion]]. |
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==Potential for tactical voting== |
==Potential for tactical voting== |
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Approval voting passes a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]], in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning. Indeed, there is never a reason for a voter to [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a candidate X without voting for all candidates he or she prefers to candidate X |
Approval voting passes a form of the [[monotonicity criterion]], in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning. Indeed, there is never a reason for a voter to [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a candidate X without voting for all candidates he or she prefers to candidate X. |
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While [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] usually implies a complete lack of a spoiler effect, in Approval voting the implication does not necessarily hold. If honest voters are expected to translate their preferences into an Approval ballot by making use of a particular rule, the rule may lead the election outcome to depend on what non-winning candidates were present. See [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Implications|implications of IIA]]. |
While [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] usually implies a complete lack of a spoiler effect, in Approval voting the implication does not necessarily hold. If honest voters are expected to translate their preferences into an Approval ballot by making use of a particular rule, the rule may lead the election outcome to depend on what non-winning candidates were present. See [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Implications|implications of IIA]]. |