Bucklin voting: Difference between revisions
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In the above example, Memphis voters have the most first place votes and might not offer a second preference in hopes of winning, but this attempted strategy fails because they are not a second favorite from competitors. |
In the above example, Memphis voters have the most first place votes and might not offer a second preference in hopes of winning, but this attempted strategy fails because they are not a second favorite from competitors. |
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== Notes == |
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Example where the [[Condorcet winner]] and Bucklin winner diverge:<blockquote>40 B>A>V |
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20 V>B |
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40 C>Z>V</blockquote>The Bucklin winner is B with 60 votes at the 2nd rank, while the Condorcet winner is V (V [[Pairwise counting|pairwise beats]] A, B, C, and Z with 60 votes to 40.) |
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Clone-proofness failure:<blockquote> |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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!Number |
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!Ballots |
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|- |
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|48 |
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|A>C |
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|- |
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|40 |
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|B>D>A |
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|- |
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|3 |
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|C |
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|- |
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|9 |
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|C>A |
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|} |
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Here, nobody has a majority in the first preferences, so when the next rankings are added in, C wins in both Bucklin and ER-Bucklin. |
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Create a clone of C, C' |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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!Number |
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!Ballots |
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|- |
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|24 |
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|A>C>C' |
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|- |
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|24 |
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|A>C'>C |
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|- |
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|40 |
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|B>D>A |
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|- |
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|3 |
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|C>C' |
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|- |
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|9 |
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|C>C'>A |
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|} |
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A wins, having attained a majority on the third preferences (exceeding both C and C') in both Bucklin and ER-Bucklin.<ref>https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/eyjlja/the_new_hampshire_libertarian_primary_used_a/fgjpa4p/</ref></blockquote> |
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== See also == |
== See also == |