Center squeeze: Difference between revisions

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== Effect of strategy ==

Some voting methods are not only vulnerable to center squeeze, but in fact, make it difficult for voters to combat the effect with strategy. [[IRV]] may be one of these: Suppose the 1st choices of the voters are 25% for the Very Liberal party, 10% for the Liberal party, and 20% for the Center party, with the rest going to the Conservative party. Putting the Center party strategically 1st in IRV risks eliminating the Liberal party, at which point their votes may go more towards the Very Liberal party, eliminating the Center party; if a liberal voter desiring consensus instead puts the Liberal party 1st, that makes it more likely the Center party will be eliminated first, and then their voters' 2nd choice may help the Liberal party eliminate the Very Liberal party, resulting in more consensus overall than if the Very Liberal party had won.

== Notes ==

3-candidate example for center squeeze under [[Condorcet]]:

48 A>B

5 B

47 C>B

When ignoring C, the votes become 52 voters preferring B to 48 preferring A. If ignoring A instead, the votes become 53 to 47 B to C. So in both directions, the center candidate is preferred by a majority, and thus is the [[Condorcet winner]].

== External links ==