4,212
edits
Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
A little restructuring; I'll explain more on the talk page
mNo edit summary |
(A little restructuring; I'll explain more on the talk page) |
||
Line 2:
This scenario has been called the "chicken dilemma" because in many election systems, the two majority subfactions are in a situation that resembles the classic "[[W:Chicken (game)|chicken]]" or "snowdrift" game (especially if voters are not sure which of the two subfactions is larger).
== Definition ==
Below are two definitions of Chicken Dilemma; "CD" and "CD2"
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.▼
====Premise====▼
# There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.▼
# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.▼
# The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.▼
# The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.▼
# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.▼
==== Requirement ====▼
B doesn't win.▼
=== CD2 ===
CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition:▼
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are▼
the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters▼
who vote C over everyone else.▼
'''Premise:'''▼
1. There are 3 candidate: A, B, and C.▼
2. If the A voters and B voters all voted both A and B over C, then C▼
couldn't win.▼
3. The ballot set is such that if C withdrew from the election and the▼
count, A would win.▼
5. The B voters don't vote A over anyone.▼
'''Requirement:'''▼
B doesn't win.▼
== Analysis ==
Line 38 ⟶ 80:
* 45: C>>A=B
▲The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.
▲====Premise====
▲# There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
▲# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.
▲# The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.
▲# The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
▲# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.
▲==== Requirement ====
▲B doesn't win.
In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".
Line 62 ⟶ 87:
ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]
Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another simple implementation of it?
...maybe one that doesn't speak of numbers of voters in the factions?
▲CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition:
▲== CD2: ==
▲The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are
▲the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters
▲who vote C over everyone else.
▲'''Premise:'''
▲1. There are 3 candidate: A, B, and C.
▲2. If the A voters and B voters all voted both A and B over C, then C
▲couldn't win.
▲3. The ballot set is such that if C withdrew from the election and the
▲count, A would win.
▲4. The A voters vote B over C.
▲5. The B voters don't vote A over anyone.
▲'''Requirement:'''
▲B doesn't win.
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
| |||